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The selection and processing of a spatial frame of reference (FOR) in interpreting verbal
scene descriptions is of great interest to psycholinguistics. In this study, we focus on the
choice between the relative and the intrinsic FOR, addressing two questions: (a) does the
presence or absence of a background in the scene influence the selection of a FOR, and
(b) what is the effect of a previously selected FOR on the subsequent processing of a
different FOR. Our results show that if a scene includes a realistic background, this will
make the selection of the relative FORmore likely.We attribute this effect to the facilitation
of mental simulation, which enhances the relation between the viewer and the objects.
With respect to the response accuracy, we found both a higher (with the same FOR) and
a lower accuracy (with a different FOR), while for the response latencies, we only found a
delay effect with a different FOR.
Keywords: spatial perception, priming, psycholinguistics, cognitive processes, spatial reference frames, scene
perception
INTRODUCTION
Expressing spatial relations is an important aspect of every-
day communication. By using spatial terms, we indicate the
location of one object in relation to another, to ourselves, to
an interlocutor or to cardinal points. These different ways of
expressing a spatial relation depend on the choice of frame of
reference (FOR). A FOR can generally be described as a set
of axes that defines space (Carlson, 1999). The point of inter-
section constitutes the origin (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976).
The relative FOR establishes a ternary relationship which com-
prises a reference object, a located object, and a viewpoint. Using
the intrinsic FOR, however, leads to a viewpoint-independent
binary relationship between a reference object and located object
(Levinson, 1996, 2003). In the present study, the origin of
the relative FOR coincides with the egocentric perspective of
the viewer whereas the origin of the intrinsic FOR is object-
centered. The absolute FOR depends on environmental features
such as cardinal points and will not be considered in the present
study.
Crucially, spatial projective terms such as “next to,” “in front
of” and “behind” (“neben,” “vor” and “hinter” in German) are
ambiguous if it is unclear which FOR is adopted. Different FORs
appear to be used differently in everyday life. There have been
many attempts to identify preferences for specific FORs lead-
ing to ambiguous results. The relative FOR, being perceptually
available and avoiding the extra computational effort needed
for mental rotation, has been considered predominant by some
authors (Linde and Labov, 1975; Levelt, 1982, 1989) whereas
other authors have claimed that the intrinsic FOR predominates
(Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976) or is at least preferred (Carlson-
Radvansky and Irwin, 1993; Carlson-Radvansky and Radvansky,
1996; Taylor et al., 1999). How FORs are chosen and main-
tained has been studied intensively (e.g., Carlson-Radvansky and
Irwin, 1994; Carlson, 1999; Watson et al., 2004; Ball et al., 2009).
Research has shown that, when choosing a FOR, all FORs are
initially active (Carlson-Radvansky and Irwin, 1994) until one is
selected. This selection is affected by various situational factors,
for instance by functional relations between the objects (Carlson-
Radvansky and Radvansky, 1996), motion characteristics (Levelt,
1984), gravity (Friederici and Levelt, 1990), or by alignment to the
FOR chosen by the interlocutor in dialogue (Watson et al., 2004).
These results indicate that there may not be a uniform default
FOR but rather that the FOR selection is affected by situational
influences.
A question that has, to our knowledge, not been addressed yet
is whether the type of scene used to present the stimuli has a direct
effect on the acceptability and processing of different FORs. This
question arises from considerations of the disparities between
FORs and of the role of embodiment.
A principle difference between the relative and the intrinsic
FOR is that only the former requires the viewer as an origin.
The relative FOR is indispensable for our navigation in the world
as its use involves computation of relevant spatial relations. As
the relative FOR originates in the viewer, an embodiment of the
viewer may be considered a necessary prerequisite. Using the rel-
ative FOR for depictions therefore requires a mental simulation
of a positioned viewer in the scene. Mental simulation in the pro-
cessing of spatial relations irrespective of FOR has been reported
elsewhere (e.g., Coventry et al., 2010).
We assume that there is little incentive for such a mental
simulation of a viewer in depictions that exclusively involve con-
figurations of objects and do not contain natural elements and
that the relative FOR may thus be less preferred than the intrinsic
FOR. However, if object configurations are embedded in depic-
tions of natural environments, the use of the relative FOR may
becomemore likely, as it is easier for a viewer to imagine being in a
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natural environment than in a scene that only contains “floating”
objects.
Recent studies varied in their construction of scenes. Studies
that have found a preference for the intrinsic compared to the rel-
ative FOR vary from using only a depiction of two ormore objects
without background elements (e.g., Carlson-Radvansky and
Radvansky, 1996; Taylor and Rapp, 2004) to line-drawing scenes
with rudimentary background elements (Carlson-Radvansky and
Irwin, 1993). However, Taylor and Tversky (1996) showed that
speakers chose different frames of reference for their descriptions
of spatial environments depending on the characteristics of the
scene they were shown.
We assume that presenting a realistic scene might result in a
processing advantage for the relative FOR, as viewers are more
likely to perform a mental simulation and establish a relation
between the objects and themselves. Therefore, we hypothesize
a higher acceptability of the relative FOR in more naturalistic
scenes.
We investigated this hypothesis by presenting identical object
configurations in two different scenes, and measuring the accept-
ability and reaction times (RTs) in a sentence-picture verification
task. Sentences in German such as “Die Pflanze ist vor dem Stuhl”
(“The plant is in front of the chair”) were used to assign a refer-
ence frame to the picture. In order to present a realistic scene, we
chose a living-room scenario so that, in one version, the depiction
showed a room with two embedded objects, whereas in the other
version the same two objects were depicted in front of a white
background.
In addition to the influence of scene type on FOR selection
we were also interested in FOR-related priming effects. Recent
studies have shown that the time needed for spatial term assign-
ment in a FOR is prolonged when a different FOR has previously
been processed (Carlson-Radvansky and Jiang, 1998; Carlson and
van Deman, 2008). This effect1 has been interpreted as inhibi-
tion of the non-selected FOR (Carlson and van Deman, 2008).
However, this investigation of priming effects focused on RTs,
and did not include an analysis of response accuracy. If RTs
were prolonged due to inhibition, we hypothesize that the accu-
racy ratings could also be affected. Inhibition of the non-selected
FOR should lead to more rejections of targets following a prime
trial with a different FOR than with a neutral or identical FOR.
More rejections are expected because the inhibited FOR may not
only be more difficult to process, which is revealed by longer
response latencies, but also, in cases of stronger inhibition, be less
available.
Even though priming effects in FOR selection have not been
reported for RTs, other studies have suggested their possible exis-
tence. Watson et al. (2004) reported that interlocutors in dialog
tended to use the same FOR as their interlocutor had previously
used. This alignment effect was argued to result from priming of
FORs. Thus, it is plausible to assume that not only can a differ-
ent FOR delay responses, but that the same FOR can also speed
up responses due to FOR priming, and that these effects might be
observable in both RTs and accuracy ratings.
1This effect has also been called “negative priming” in the literature (Carlson-
Radvansky and Jiang, 1998; Carlson and van Deman, 2008).
In order to assess these different possible effects of same and
different FORs on accuracy and RTs, we included three condi-
tions in the experiment: a match condition in which prime and
target used the same FOR, a mismatch condition, which required
switching the FOR between prime and target and a control con-
dition, in which the prime trial did not disambiguate between
FORs. Thus, the FOR on the target trial could either have been
activated by having been used in the preceding trial (match con-
dition) or inhibited by being available but not being selected
(mismatch condition). The control condition served as a baseline
for comparisons.
Our expectations were that having the same FOR would result
in more acceptances of target trials in the match condition than in
the control condition, while having different FORs would result
in more rejected target trials in the mismatch condition than in
the control condition. With regard to RTs, different FORs are
predicted to lead to longer response latencies in mismatch tar-
get trials than in the control target trials, as described in earlier
studies (Carlson-Radvansky and Jiang, 1998; Carlson and van
Deman, 2008), while having the same FOR was predicted to yield
shorter response latencies for target trials in the match condition
compared to the control condition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty students of Bielefeld University (21 men, 29 women) rang-
ing in age from 20 to 62 (M = 26.9, SD = 8.5) were paid for
their participation in the experiment. All participants were native
German-speakers and each of them saw only one version (either
the one with or the one without background).
STIMULI AND DESIGN
The experiment comprised 400 trials, consisting of 96 prime
and 96 target trials as well as 200 distractor trials and 4 prime-
target pairs with definite “no” answers according to both FORs.
Sentence-picture verification for the prime trials were correct
for the neutral configurations and for the relative and intrinsic
FOR in 32 cases each. With regard to the target trials, 48 cases
were correct for the relative and 48 for the intrinsic FOR. We
thus made sure that 50% of the trials had as correct response
“yes” and the other 50% had “no” as a correct response. The
distractor trials consisted of 100 “yes” and 100 “no” response
trials.
Stimuli consisted of a sentence and a picture presented sub-
sequently. The sentence was presented auditorily (in German)
and spatially described the object configuration in the picture.
Sentence duration was approximately 2 s and during its pre-
sentation, participants saw a white screen. Immediately after
the presentation of the stimulus sentence, the picture was
shown.
Pictures of object configurations were created using indoor
planning software (“Sweet Home 3D”) in two versions which
differed in background. In one version, following Henderson
and Hollingworth’s (1999) idea, we used a semantically coher-
ent, human-scaled view of a living-room (Figure 1). This version
constituted a true scene (Henderson and Ferreira, 2004), which
will be referred to here as “scene with background.” In the other
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version, the object configurations were shown in front of a white
background (Figure 2). This version (ersatz scene, Henderson
and Ferreira, 2004) will be referred to here as “scene without
background.” Participants saw either the version with or the ver-
sion without background, therefore there were equal number
of scenes with and without background. The size of the scene
FIGURE 1 | Scene with background and both FOR.
was 33 × 17 cm and the unconstrained viewing distance was
approximately 70 cm.
Three types of pictures were created: experimental, neutral,
and distractor. The experimental pictures consisted of two dis-
crete objects in the foreground (reference object and located
object). We used three different triaxial reference objects (chair,
armchair, sofa), which were rotated on the vertical axis at angles
of 0, 90, and 270◦ in order to vary the mapping of the horizontal
intrinsic axes to the horizontal relative axes. Reference objects in
the prime and target pictures had the same orientation and were
always in an upright position. The located objects were biaxial
(plant, stool) thus revealing no predefined horizontal orienta-
tion and were placed along the horizontal axes of the reference
object (in front of, behind, to the left/right of). For the 0◦ rota-
tion, the located object was only positioned to the left/right of in
order to dissociate the relative and the intrinsic FOR. In order to
keep the number of trials within a reasonable limit, we did not
present every object in every possible combination of rotation,
located object, and reference frame in all three conditions as this
would have led to 180 prime target pairs. Thus, we reduced the
number of target pictures to 16 which were presented with both
FOR in all three conditions resulting in 96 prime target pairs. The
32 target trials (16 with a relative FOR and 16 with an intrinsic
FOR) in each experimental condition consisted of 8 trials with
FIGURE 2 | Examples for prime-target-pairs in each condition.
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0◦ rotation, 12 trials with 90◦ rotation, and 12 trials with 270◦
rotation. The position of the located object was controlled for the
axis between prime and target trials: the located object was posi-
tioned on the same axis in 16 prime and target trials and across
axis in the other 16 trials per condition. The reference object and
located object were positioned at the same, short distance from
each other throughout the picture sequence.
In neutral pictures, the located object was placed along the
vertical axis of the reference object leading to an alignment of
the FORs. This alignment eliminated the need for the viewer
to choose between the intrinsic and the relative FOR. For these
configurations, eight additional objects were introduced (bench,
box, chest, bottle, lamp, notebook, fish tank, carpet). Fifty dis-
tractor pictures were created that contained only a single discrete
object in the foreground (pieces of furniture, toys, a book, a
bottle, etc.).
The presentation of the visual stimuli was preceded by an
auditorily presented sentence (in German) describing the object
configuration and implicitly assigning the intrinsic or the rela-
tive FOR (or both in the control condition). The sentence “The
<located object> is <spatial term> the <reference object>” was
played over loudspeakers. See Figure 1 for an example picture of
a scene with background with intrinsic and relative FOR. In the
distractor trials the sentence “The <object> is <adjective>” was
used, with a color or shape adjective. The picture remained on
the screen until a response was given. There was no inter-trial
interval.
Using a standard priming paradigm, we constructed three
conditions of prime-target pairs: two experimental (match, mis-
match) and one control condition. All three conditions had iden-
tical target trials in order to directly compare, both within-subject
and within-item, the influence of the different prime conditions.
Furthermore, each target trial was presented both with a relative
and with an intrinsic FOR. In thematch condition, prime and tar-
get trials used the same FOR (intrinsic-intrinsic, relative-relative).
The mismatch condition contained different FORs for prime and
target trial (intrinsic-relative, relative-intrinsic) and in the con-
trol condition a specific FOR was only used for the target picture
(neutral-relative, neutral-intrinsic). We thus obtained a 2 × 3
design consisting of the factors “background” (with, without) and
“priming condition” (match, mismatch, control) and accuracy
and RTs of target trials as dependent variables. See Figure 2 for
examples of Prime-Target pairs for each condition using a relative
FOR in the Target trials.
With regard to scene type analysis, accuracy and RTs of
prime trials were dependent variables in a 2 × 2 design with
the factors “background” (with and without) and FOR (relative
and intrinsic). Both FOR had identical prime trials to compare
within-subject and within-item the effect of FOR processing.
To avoid effects resulting from simple repetition priming, we
used different objects as well as different spatial terms for prime
and target sentences. Furthermore, two distractor pictures were
presented between successive prime-target pairs in order to avoid
interactions between the FORs. In order to minimize other influ-
ences on FOR selection, we only used object configurations which
did not show a functional relation between located objects and
reference object (Carlson-Radvansky and Radvansky, 1996).
The randomization procedure took into account the priming
condition, the rotation of the reference object (different rotations
between prime-target pairs) and the reference object (changing
objects between prime-target pairs) as well as the located object
(position).
PROCEDURE
At the beginning of the experiment, the instructions were shown
in written form on the monitor, informing the participants that
they would hear a sentence after which a picture would be shown.
The participants’ task was to determine whether the sentence
was an adequate description of the picture as quickly and accu-
rately as possible and respond by pressing predefined yes/no
keys on a button box. The experiment started with 5 practice
trials followed by 400 experimental trials. In each trial, a sen-
tence was presented acoustically (i.e., played on loudspeakers)
while the computer monitor showed a white screen. Immediately
afterwards, a picture of the aforementioned object configura-
tion was shown. The picture remained on the screen until a
response was given. Response times weremeasured from the onset
of the picture display to the key-press response using E-Prime
(Psychology Tools Software). The participants were unaware of
the objective of the experiment and of the type of trials they
were completing. No feedback was given during the experiment.
The experiment lasted 30min including a short break midway
through.
RESULTS
Statistical analysis was carried out in “R” software (R Core
Development Team, 2011) using the lme4 package (Bates et al.,
2011). Linear mixed-effects models were used for the analysis
of RTs and mixed-effects logistic regression (generalized linear
mixed models, GLMM) for the analysis of accuracy.
RTs below 200ms and above 4000ms (1.4% of the data) were
considered outliers, and were excluded from the analysis.
SCENE TYPE
Descriptions regarding the neutral prime pictures were accepted
in both conditions in 99% of the cases and were excluded from
the analysis (33.3% of the data) as they did not require a choice
between the intrinsic or the relative FOR. Accuracy and RTs of
prime trials are presented in Table 1.
In order to analyse effects of scene type and FOR on prime
trial accuracy, we implemented a mixed-effects logistic regres-
sion analysis. We posited scene type, FOR and their interaction
as fixed effects, and used random slopes and intercepts for sub-
jects and items. We found a significant main effect of FOR,
Table 1 | Accuracy and reaction times of prime trials.
FOR Without background With background
Accuracy (%) RT in ms (SD) Accuracy (%) RT in ms (SD)
Relative 47.6 1105.7 (597) 58.9 1146 (559)
Intrinsic 78 1148.2 (610) 55.4 1189 (561)
Control 99.1 749.8 (316) 99.4 802.1 (365)
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revealing a higher acceptability of the intrinsic compared to
the relative FOR (β = −2.9, SE = 1.11, Z = −2.63, p < 0.001).
Furthermore, there was a significant main effect of scene type
(β = −2.14, SE = 0.72, Z = −2.99, p < 0.01) and a significant
interaction between the two reflecting the higher accuracy of the
intrinsic FOR in the condition without background (β = 2.92,
SE = 1.48, Z = 1.97, p < 0.05).
RTs of the correct prime trials using the relative or intrin-
sic FOR were analysed (39.8% of the prime trials). Fitting a
linear mixed-effects model with RT of the prime trial as depen-
dent variable, a random slope and intercept for subjects and a
random intercept for items, no significant main effects of back-
ground (β = −0.8912, SE = 84.3531, t = −0.011, p > 0.05) or
FOR (β = −125.7638, SE = 91.61, t = 1.373, p > 0.05) were
found.
PRIMING EFFECTS
Subsets of data were used for the statistical analysis of priming
effects, as we wish to consider only those trials in which the poten-
tial prime was accepted by the participants. In the analysis of the
acceptability of target trials, we considered only trials that fol-
lowed an accepted prime trial (72.9% of the trials). In the analysis
of target RTs, we considered only trials in which both the prime
and the target were accepted (45.9%).
For the analysis of target trial accuracy with regard to prim-
ing effects, we fitted a logistic mixed-effects model with scene
type and priming condition as fixed effects, a random slope, and
intercepts for subjects and a random intercept for items. Model
comparison revealed a significant main effect of priming condi-
tion (p < 0.001) but not of scene type. Accuracy of match and
mismatch condition differed significantly from the control con-
dition revealing a higher accuracy in the match condition (β = 1,
SE = 0.39, Z = 2.58, p < 0.01) and a lower accuracy in the mis-
match condition (β = −0.8, SE = 0.37, Z = −2.14, p < 0.05).
Figure 3 depicts the accuracy of target trials after an accurate
prime trial collapsed across background version.
FIGURE 3 | Percentage of accepted target trials.
In order to analyse priming effects with regard to RTs, we fit-
ted a linear mixed-effects model with full random slopes and
intercepts for subjects and a random intercept for items. Taking
the target RT as the dependent variable and the scene type
and priming condition as independent variables, model com-
parison revealed that only the priming condition yielded a sig-
nificant main effect (p < 0.05). This effect was attributable to
the prolongation of RTs in the mismatch condition (β = 226.71,
SE = 56.49, t = 4.01, p < 0.01) while the match condition did
not differ significantly from the control condition (β = 42.92,
SE = 53.00, t = 0.81, p > 0.05). Mean accuracy, RTs, and stan-
dard deviations (SD) are shown in Table 2. In order to quantify
the priming effect, we calculated the differences in RTs by sub-
tracting the mismatch and match from the control condition.
DISCUSSION
INFLUENCE OF SCENE TYPE ON FOR PROCESSING
Our results revealed main effects of FOR and background on
accuracy in the prime trials as well as a significant interac-
tion between FOR and background. The interaction suggested
that the clear preference for the intrinsic FOR in the condition
without background was diminished in the condition with back-
ground, resulting in both FORs being accepted almost equally
often. This equalization of accuracy resulted from a decrease
in accuracy of the intrinsic FOR combined with an increase in
accuracy of the relative FOR. The latter reflects our expecta-
tions that people are more likely to use the relative FOR and
thus bring in their own perspective when the scene is more
natural than in depictions without background elements. Being
based on the viewer’s direct perception (Miller and Johnson-
Laird, 1976), Levinson (1996) claimed that “relative systems of
spatial description build in a viewpoint” (p. 371), which implies
that using the relative FOR demands an embodied viewer in
order to establish this viewpoint. Requiring an embodied ori-
gin, the relative FOR can only be processed in depictions of
scenes via a mental simulation of the viewer in the scene. This
stands in line with Wilson’s (2002) idea that off-line cogni-
tion is body based and that sensorimotor resources are used to
simulate physical aspects of the world. Thus, when natural ele-
ments are included, this increases the probability of establishing
a ternary relationship resulting in a “boost” in the availability of
the relative FOR.
Interpreting the decrease in acceptability of the intrinsic
FOR in the scene with background, as indicated by the main
effect of background condition, however, is not straightforward.
General preferences for the intrinsic FOR have been reported
Table 2 | Mean reaction times and accuracy for target trials.
Primingcondition Accuracy (%) Reaction time Priming effect
in ms (SD) (ms)
Match 89.1 1061 (515) −44
Mismatch 41.5 1247 (662) −230*
Control 61.4 1017 (516) –
*p < 0.01.
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in previous studies (e.g., Carlson-Radvansky and Irwin, 1993;
Carlson-Radvansky and Radvansky, 1996; Taylor et al., 1999;
Taylor and Rapp, 2004). Given that these studies did not use
scenes with background, the results are comparable to our find-
ings for the scene without background. The scene with back-
ground may, however, have led to a decrease in this preference
by reducing its saliency and increasing the saliency of the rel-
ative FOR. Findings that point to the influence of the envi-
ronment on FOR selection have been described by Taylor and
Tversky (1996), who showed that participants used relative,
intrinsic, and extrinsic frames of reference differently depending
on the environment they were asked to describe. They inter-
preted their findings as a reflection of how we interact with the
environment.
Another line of research that points in this direction are
findings from studies using neuroimaging technology to inves-
tigate brain activation patterns resulting from different visual
stimuli. In general, stimuli embedded in a scene and stimuli
presented without background scene induce different brain acti-
vation patterns. Using fMRI technology, a certain brain region,
the “parahippocampal place area” (PPA), could be identified,
which responded selectively to scenes but not to single objects
or object arrays (e.g., Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998; Henderson
et al., 2008). In addition, it has been reported that the visually
perceived spatial structure of the environment is processed by
the PPA (Epstein et al., 1999) and that the PPA is viewpoint-
specific and thus plays a crucial role in establishing the rela-
tionship between the viewer and the spatial structures of the
environment (Epstein et al., 2003). Thus, these findings may
reflect that the relative FOR, for which the establishment of a
relationship between the viewer and spatial structures is a pre-
requisite, is more likely to be used in scenes compared to object
arrays.
Interestingly, activation of brain areas in the middle temporal
and middle superior temporal areas have recently been reported
as resulting from mentally simulated motion in the processing of
static pictures (Coventry et al., in press). The localisatory differ-
ences may be explained by the fact that mental simulation did
not require a viewpoint in the scene and the stimuli were pictures
without background.
Our results indicate that humans have different preferences
for FORs depending on the scene type. Following this idea, we
assume a further decrease in preference for the intrinsic FOR in
favor of the relative FOR when participants are embodied in the
scene. This is a matter for further investigations.
PRIMING EFFECTS
Our experiment was designed to investigate priming effects for
RTs and accuracy ratings. The results showed longer RTs and
lower accuracy ratings for different FORs, but for same FORS we
only found higher accuracy ratings and no RT effect.
Longer RTs for different FORs have been reported previously
(Carlson-Radvansky and Jiang, 1998; Carlson and van Deman,
2008) and our results support these earlier findings. The pro-
longation of RTs in trials that required a switching of FORs has
been interpreted as inhibition (Carlson-Radvansky and Jiang,
1998; Carlson and van Deman, 2008). This inhibition increases
the cognitive effort needed for the adoption of different FORs in
subsequent trials.
However, we did not only find longer RTs but also lower accu-
racy ratings. We interpret this as resulting from the strength of
inhibition. Longer RTs reflect relatively mild inhibition, as the
FOR that was inhibited could still be adopted. The fact that a
large proportion of trials in the mismatch condition were rejected
reflects a more powerful inhibition, one that made the FOR
completely unavailable.
With regard to the RTs, we found no processing advantages
in the match condition. However, the accuracy of target trials in
the match condition was significantly higher than in the control
condition. This suggests the presence of a priming effect. It has
been claimed that, initially, multiple FORs are active and com-
pete for selection (Carlson-Radvansky and Irwin, 1994; Carlson-
Radvansky and Jiang, 1998). Our results reveal that the selection
of a specific FOR leads to a persistently higher level of activation in
the subsequent trial and thus to a selection advantage. This indi-
cates that FOR selection is not only accompanied by inhibition of
the non-selected FOR but also by a higher level of activation of
the selected FOR.
The finding that participants showed a corresponding effect
for accuracy in both conditions, but for RT there was only a
prolongation in the mismatch condition, is difficult to explain.
We speculate that the higher processing complexity of switching
FOR in the mismatch condition also leads to a higher error rate
in the sentence verification, whereas the easier processing in the
match condition makes the sentence verification less error prone.
This would imply that there is no speed-accuracy trade-off in this
task, which is supported by an inspection of the RTs in the trials
with erroneous responses: the erroneous responses were slower
(M = 1184, SD = 535) than the correct responses (M = 1139,
SD = 577, t(2559) = 2, p < 0.05).
The preference for using the same FOR has also been shown
in a dialogue study, in which speakers tended to use the same
FOR as their interlocutor had (Watson et al., 2004). This align-
ment was attributed to priming effects and has been described
for different levels of linguistic representation including abstract
concepts such as FORs (see Pickering and Garrod, 2004, for an
overview). Priming effects are thus discussed to play a central role
in communication (Pickering and Garrod, 2004).
In conclusion, our results show that people are more likely
to describe a scene from an egocentric point of view when the
scene has a realistic background. We explain this phenomenon
by assuming that the presence of a background stimulates an
embodied mental simulation of a real scene.
More generally, our results show that priming does not only
have facilitatory effects on referential communication, but can
also slow us down or decrease our communicational efficiency,
depending on the sequential context in which utterances occur.
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